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Introduction 
 
In 359, Šāpur II (r. 309-379) led his army against Rome. This campaign 
became a milestone for the balance of power in Romano-Iranian borderlands. After 
seventy three Šāpur succeeded in breaking through the defenses and in sacking the city 
of Amida
1
. According to Ammianus Marcellinus the primal target of the attack  
of the Iranian armies were to be the rich cities of Syria however the defensive 
operations of the Romans in Northern Mesopotamia Šāpur to direct the assult 
Northward. The Historians testimony concludes that long lasting, heroic defense  
of Amida saved the Roman cities of Cappadocia from sacking. In the context  
of military-political actions of Šāpur this interpretation presented by Ammianus 
Marcellinus becomes less obvious. 
 
I 
 
In 290 Diocletian (r. 284-305) was to introduce Trdat (Tiridates; r. 298?-330?) 
of the Arsacid dynasty to the Armenian throne
2
. This situation would lead  
to weakening of the position of Narseh (r. 272-293) the youngest son of Šāpur I  
 (r. 242-272), who ruled Persarmenia (Armenia Maior) after his father’s death3. 
Although Agathangelos testified that the Sasanians were forced out of Armenia
4
, 
however, following the inscription from Pāikūlī describing the events of 2935 it must 
be assumed that Narseh retained the power in Persarmenia
6
. 
After the death of Bahrām II a serious crisis of the Iranian empire took place. 
The coronation of Bahrām III (r. 293)7, which, against established rules of succession8 
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resulted in the mutiny of the aristocracy in course of which the power in Iran took over 
Narseh (r. 293-305) who until that time held the office of šāh Arminān9. In 296, taking 
advantage of Diocletian’s engagement in Egypt, Narseh attacked Roman Armenia  
and Syria
10
. The army dispatched against him, commanded by Galerius, was crushed 
by the Iranian forces between Carrhae and Callinicum
11
. After Diocletian’s arrival in 
Antioch, a new campaign began. A part of the army under the command of Diocletian 
marched into Mesopotamia, while Galerius’s main forces struck from Armenia, 
triumphing over Narseh’s army in the battle of Satala in 29812.  
The peace treaty concluded in 298, due to which Narseh withdrew from 
Armenia and renounced his claim to the Trans-Tigritania and established Roman 
protectorate in Iberia
13
. Apart from the territorial changes, a decision concerning 
Nisibis, which turned out to be of paramount importance for the later Roman-Iranian 
relations, was made. Namely Diocletian made this city the only place for trade 
exchange between the two countries, putting Rome in the privileged position  
in relation to Iran
14
. The significance of this decision lied in the fact that after  
the destruction of Ḥaṭrā, Dura Europos and Palmyra the trade routes moved from  
the Euphrates to the Tigris
15
. 
Adoption of Christianity in Armenia by Trdat during the early years of Šāpūr 
II’s resulted in closure of the kingdom with Rome16. Trdat’s agreement with 
Constantine was most probably a result of the ruler’s problems with the Armenian 
opposition strongly associated to the Iranian tradition
17
. Internal conflicts in Armenia 
increased especially after the marriage of prince Wahan Mamikonean with Hormozd-
duxtak
18
, daughter of Hormozd II. After the death of Trdat a group of Armenian 
Naxarars, in communication with ecclesiastical hierarchy strove to tighten the teis with 
Rome. Bishop Vrt’anes in his letter addressed to emperor requested military assistance 
of the Roman armies in Armenia recalling common cree
19
. Probably c. 336 Šāpur II 
intervened in Armenia. He succeeded in capturing Armenian King Tiran (r. 330?-
338)
20. However, Iranian prince Narseh’s capture Amida21 and the subsequent loss in 
the battle of Narasara
22
 with the Romans turned out to be a true prelude to the real 
longlasting conflict
23
.  
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In 337, Iranian army invaded north Mesopotamia
24
. The diplomatic 
negotiations were installed
25. Constantine then resolved to campaign against Šāpur 
himself, but the emperor became sick and death (22 May, 337)
26
. Despite numerous 
individual victories of the Iranian army in Mesopotamia, Rome was successful in 
sustaining Nisibis, the main aim of Šāpur’s attacks27. At the break of 337/338 
Constantius II (r. 337-361) arrived to Mesopotamia, already abandoned by the Iranian 
armies
28
. In 338, however, Šāpūr agreed to the release of the royal family of Armenia 
and to the enthronement of Aršak II (r. 350-367)29. The Roman at that time launched 
limited, singular raids aimed in devastation of the territories on the left bank  
of Tigris
30
.  
The first phase of it, was not particularly fruitful for the Iranians operating  
in Mesopotamia. Even though they defeated the Roman army in the vicinity of Singara 
(344, 348) twice
31, despite several attempts Šāpur was not able to achieve the main 
goal of his expedition, namely Nisibis (337, 346, 350)
32
, which still remained under  
the Roman control
33
. The encroachment of the nomadic invaders from Central Asia 
forced Šāpur to turn his attention to the East34. In 350, Magnentius had rebelled and 
killed the emperor Constans, claiming the purple. Constantius prepared to move 
against the usurper, and because of that Gallus (r. 351-354) was made Caesar  
of the Roman Empire and placed in charge of the defense of the East. For few coming 
years the military Operations in Mesopotamia were stuck in stelmate
35. Šāpur pacified 
the threat from the East by setting an Alliance with the king Grumbates
36
. 
In the winter of 357/358, Constantius received embassy from the Šāhānšāh 
who demanded that Rome restore the lands surrendered by Narseh. Despite  
the attempts to instigate negotiations by the diplomats of Constantius it was clear that 
demanding the conditions impossible for the emperor to fulfill was in fact renewal  
of the war by Šāpur37. Warfare was resumed in the spring of the year 359. 
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II 
 
The reign of Diocletian (r. 284-305) turned out to be decisive for  
the distribution of power in the Near East. The emperor modernized the defence system 
by creating limes named Strata Diocletiana
38
. The emperor created of a two-tiered 
military force: the Comitatenses and the Limitanei
39
. Constantine continued 
Diocletian’s strategy for the defense of the Roman Empire40. The legions were 
stationed in fortress cities, the cavalry was stationed along road lines. 
In the early 4
th
 century CE, the main defensive point in North Mesopotamia 
was Nisibis (Greek: Νίσιβις). The system of the Roman defensive strategy was 
constituted by Nisibis accompanied by Bezabde (Greek: Βηζάβδη) on Western Tigris41 
and Singara (Greek: τὰ Σίγγαρα) on the Southern slope of Jebei Sinjar mountaine.  
The system was supplemented by Amida (Greek: Ἄμιδα) located North-West from 
Nisibis. 
During Diocletian’s administrative reorganization of the border territories, 
Nisibis became a capital of newly constituted province of Mesopotamia and  
the headquarters of the dux Mesopotamiae. Furthermore Nisibis was gatheing point for 
the field army of the magister militum per Orientem, being the main mobile force used 
to support the troops located in the border fortresses
42
. City was described  
by Ammianus as “the strongest bulwark of the Orient”43. The main military unit 
stationing in Nisibis was the the Legio I Parthica
44
. 
Bezabde was to control the region of Zabdicene. It seems that from strategical 
perspective, the more important goal was, on one hand, blocking the road to Arzanene 
and Greater Sophene, on the other hand, securing of the strategic passes leading 
through the Taurus mountains into central Armenia
45
. The Legio II Flavia stationed  
in the city
46
. Perhaps also the Legio III Parthica
47
. Probably Bezabde was the third 
stronghold (together with Amida and Cepha) rebuilt by Constantius II, still during 
Constantine lifespan, mentioned by Jacob the Recluse
48
. 
Singara controlled crossing points of the Tigris River from Adiabene 
direction
49
. The permanent garrisons of the city was the Legio I Flavia
50
. Ammianus 
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45 LIGHTFOOT 1983. 
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of Constantine's reign and was related to reconstruction of the three strongholds. LIGHTFOOT 1981: 104, 
n. 12. 
47 Dio Cassius LV 24. 4; ISAAC 1990: 42, n. 150. 
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49 READE 1999: 286-288, 
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Marcelinus in context of the events of 360 lists also the Legio I Parthica
51
, however  
the presence of the legion in the city is confirmed only at the beginning of 3
rd
 century
52
. 
The strategic goal of Singara garrison was warning about possible movements  
of Iranian armies crossing Tigris. 
Amida was the city situated on the west bank of the upper Tigris, which was  
to protect for Greater Sophene
53
. In 336, Constantius initiated a major refortification  
of the city, enhancing the city's circuit stout walls and constructing strong towers
54
. 
The Legio V Parthica stationed in the city
55
. 
It cannot be determined if the Legio VI Parthica stationed at the time in Castra 
Maurorum
56
. 
Probably only one of the legio was the regular garrison of the city. Other units 
were the forces strengthening the garrison during the threat of invasions. Such situation 
happened in case of Amida in 359 or presence of the Legio I Parthica in Singara;  
or the Legiones I and II Armeniaca
57
 in Bezabde one year later.  
Roman defensive system was completed by the equites units, relocated 
alongside strategic roads. They, together with the legions constituted the core  
of the field armies. In Mesopotamia the examples of such units was the troop described 
by Ammianus Marcellinus as “seven hundred horsemen… from Illyricum”, which 
operated in vicinity of Amida in 359
58
 or Cohors quartadecima Valeria Zabdenorum
59
 
participating in the defense of Bezabde in 360. 
 
III 
 
In 359, Constantius realizing the threat, made decisions about the personel 
changes at the staff. He moved some experienced commanders to the East  
with intention to lead operations against the army of Šāpur. To Euphratensis and 
Mesopotamia was sent Domitius Modestus
60
. Ursicinus (magister peditum) replace 
Barbatio, as second-in-command under Sabinianus (magister equitum per Orientem)
61
. 
Ursicinus with the army marched out of Thrace and directed to Nisibis, where intensive 
construction works were carried in preparation to expected siege
62
. According  
to Ammianus Marcellinus the division of the command and the lack of cooperation  
of Sabinianus with Ursicinus was one of the main reasons of Roman defeat in 359
63
. 
                                                          
51 Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 6. 8. 
52 ILS 9477. 
53 Jacob the Recluse, 7. 
54 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 9. 1; According to Jacob of Edessa the city was rebuilt in 348: “This year 
Constantius built the city of Amida between the rivers; and the same year the Romans fought a battle with 
the Persians by night” Jacob of Edessa, 21. 
55 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 9. 3-4. 
56 As suggested by LIGHTFOOT 1981: 75. 
57 This legions could initially be designated for intervention in Anzitene and Lesser Sophene. 
LIGHTFOOT 1981: 104-105: n. 16. 
58 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 8. 2. 
59 Or. XXXVI 36. 
60 Libanius, Epistulae, 46, 367, 383 and 388. 
61 LENSSEN 1999; OLSZANIEC 2013: 191, 284, 333,  
62 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 6. 5; 5. 8-9. 
63 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 3. 1-3. 
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The Romans, expecting the attack directed against Zeugma (crossing on 
Euphrates leading to Syria) left weakly fortified city of Carrhae. Cassianus, the dux of 
Mesopotamia employed scorched earth tactics
64
. The Roman army focused on securing 
the crossings on Euphrates
65
, while Sabinianus was preparing the defense of Edessa
66
. 
 
IV 
 
The Iranian army crossed the Greater Zab and next the Tigris north of 
Singara
67
. The plans of invasion routes of Šāpur against Rome were consulted with  
the traitor Antoninus
68
. Then the Iranian army conducted false attack head straight for 
the Euphrates, bypassing Nisibis
 69
. As communicated by Ammianus Marcellinus  
the Romans believed that the initial target of the Iranian army could be Nisibis
70
. After 
twelve days of march, the army of Šāpur reached Bebase (about 150 km from 
Constantina, west of Nisibis)
71
. And unexpeditly he did not attack Nisibis from  
the West (what could be explained be the fact that the Romans destroyed all crops in 
the region
72). Ursicinus expected that once Šāpur had passed Nisibis, than the Iranian 
army would attempt to cross Euphtates. When he moved West to assure the destruction 
of the crossings in Zeugma and Capersana, he was taken by surprise by 20.000 strong 
Iranian army heading not to Euphratus but to Amida
73
. 
Ursicinus hurried to Amida
74
. Aelianus comes of the city had at disposal  
the Legio V Parthica, Praeventores and Superventores
75
. The garrison was 
strengthened by additional units:
76
 the Gallic legions Magnentius, Decentius
77
, 
Vexillationes of Legio XXX Ulpia Victrix, Decumani of Legio X Fortensis (Decimani 
Fretensis?), Equites Illyrian regiments with a combined strength of 700
78
, and the 
comites sagittarii cavalry regiment
79
. The soldiers together with refugee farmers from 
the neighboring countryside was about 20,000 (7-10,000 of soldiers and 10-13,000 
civilians
80
). According to Ammianus, the army of Šāpur numbered about 100,000 
                                                          
64 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 3-5. 
65 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 6. 
66 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 7. 
67 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 6. 19. 
68 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 6. 3; (The defection of Antoninus to Šāpur in 357/358 FARROKH, 
MAKSYMIUK, SÁNCHEZ GRACIA 2018: 102. 
69 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 8. 
70 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII.6.8. 
71 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 9. 
72 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 8. 
73 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII, 8, 1-7; SEAGER 2010: 160-172; under the command of Tamsapor 
(*Tahm-Šāpur?) and Nohodares: Errorously Ammianus gives Nohodares as the name of teh commander 
instead of the title. In reality it was the title of a high rank official (M. Pers. *naxvadār). 
74 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 6. 17. 
75 The light-armed horsemen; Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 9. 1-9. 
76 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 9. 3-4. 
77 The legions of the usurpers Magnentius and Decentius had been post to the East after the civil war. 
78 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 8. 2. 
79 The comites sagittarii cavalry regiment could be the cavalry sent by Julian to the East prior to his 
rebellion. 
80 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVII 2. 13; XIX 2. 14; LENSKI 2007: 224-226. 
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soldiers
81
. Busa and Rema were captured en-route by Sasanian forces as they advanced 
towards Amida
82
. The city was captured after 73 days long siege, on October 4, 359
83
. 
The Roman commanders of the city were executed
84
, captured civilians were deported 
to Xuzestān85. Large losses (30,000 troops86) and late season forced Šāpur to return to 
Iran
87
. 
Conclusion 
 
It might seem that stopping of the invasion of the Iranian forces at Amida 
disabled the grand western campaign of Šāpur. Iranian armies did not attck in 359  
any other border cities. The above conclusion is founded first of all on the testimony  
of Ammianus Marcellinus who was personally involved in heroic defense of the city
88
. 
Another argument supporting this idea are the earlier campaigns, for instance Šāpur I 
in 3
rd
 century. Obviously Šāpur II truly intented to plunder Cappadocia, leaving Amida 
aside would leave Iranian forces in unfavorable situation allowing Roman army attack 
to the back of the forces operating on the enemy territory. It sould be concerned 
whether the real aim of Šāpur was indeed only plundering of the borderlands.  
From political perspective and in context of later military operations this is doubtful.  
According to Ammianus Marcellinus crossing Euphrates was impossible due 
to the flood
89
 and scorched ground tactics applied by the Romans which enforced 
changing of the direction of Iranian thrust northwards. However in the context of skill 
of the Iranian engineers in solving hydrological issues (exapled in the operations 
during the siege of Nisibis in 350) it can be assumed that the main target of Šāpur were 
Northern Mesopotamia and Amida
90
, and not Syria. 
The events of 359 and 360 should not be perceived as isolated. They should be 
observed just in light of a single campaign of 359-360. In 360 Šāpur captured two 
Roman strongholds: Singara
91
 and Bezabde
92
. If in 359 the target of the Iranian armies 
were Syria and/or Cappadocia, there was no obstacle to attack them the following year. 
In 360 Šāpur campaigned in Northern Mesopotamia because his strategic aim was 
capturing Nisibis and political – regaining control over Armenia and Iberia. 
Amida was, at one hand, a Gateway to Roman Armenia and at the other, it 
secured province Mesopotamia from the attacks from the North. Šāpur realized well its 
significance, it must be pointed out that already at the beginning of the war, in 336, 
Iranian prince Narseh’s capture Amida. Destruction of Amida was of utmost 
significance for controlling the route leading to Armenia. The political program  
of Šāpur was canellation of 298 treaty and moving the frontier westward. This was 
                                                          
81 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 6. 22; LENSKI 2007: 222. 
82 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 10. 
83 FARROKH, MAKSYMIUK, SÁNCHEZ GRACIA 2018. 
84 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 9. 2. 
85 KETTENHOFEN 1996: 299. 
86 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 9. 9; LENSKI 2007: 222. 
87 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 9. 1. 
88 For instance Warmington argues, that the target of Šāpur was Syria and facing the army of Constantius 
(1977: 515). 
89 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 8-11 and Zonaras, XIII 9. 30-31; WARMINGTON 1977: 515. 
90 JACKSON BONNER 2017: 100. 
91 Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 6. 1-9. 
92 Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 7. 1-15. 
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impossible without taking Nisibis. Destruction of Amida, taking over Singara  
and Bezabde in 360, isolated the eastern Trans-Tigritania region and what is more 
important enabled attacking Nisibis also from the North, simultaneously blocking 
communication routs of the Roman armies. This was a crucial part of the masterpan  
of capturing Nisibis. Reinforcing the fortifications and Bezabde also proves that  
the aim of Šāpur was not mere plundering of the Roman cities but setting steady 
control over North-Eastern Mesopotamia achieved by capturing Nisibis.  
The fall of Amida not only humiliated the Romans but had also wides 
consequences for the Roman positions in teh East. Roman administrative-military 
machine had been thrown into confusion
93
. What is more important the loyalty  
of Armenii
94
 and Iberia
95
 was questioned. 
The campaign of Šāpur was not finalized. He did not capture Nisibis and not 
achieved cancellation of the 298 treaty. These goals were achieved by the Šāhānšāh  
3 years later with the 363 treaty. According to the subsequent peace treaty Jovian  
 (r. 363-364) renounced his rights to the Trans-Tigritania, Singara, Castra Maurorum, 
Nisibis and fifteen other fortresses
96
. The treaty was perceived in the Empire  
as humiliating
97
, it had a vast importance from the military infrastructure perspective. 
Transfer of the fortresses of Singara and Nisibis destroyed Roman defensive system in 
North-Eastern Mezopotamia
98
. The sack of Amida and the peace agreements of 363 
had important ramifications for the position in the Caucasian region. The treaty 
demanded the withdrawal of Rome’s backing for Armenian rulers99. Acquisition  
of four-fifths of South Caucasus region to Iranian sphere of influence gave Iran clear 
strategic advantage
100
. 
In summary of the above, the thesis must be put forward that Amida was initial 
and primary target of Šāpur’s campaign of 359 and the siege was not a result  
of coincidence of various events, factors and intentions not, as it is suggested  
by Ammianus Marcellinus
101
. 
 
                                                          
93 JACKSON BONNER 2017: 101. 
94 Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 11. 1. 
95 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXI, 6. 7-8. 
96 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 7. 9-14. 
97 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 7. 13; Eutropius, X 17; Festus, XXIX; Agathias, IV 26. 7; BLOCKLEY 
1984: 34-37. 
98 BLOCKLEY 1984: 35. 
99 Festus, XXIX; Agathias, IV 26. 6-7; Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 7. 
100 HOWARD-JOHNSTON 2013: 872. 
101 According to Ammianus, Šāpur did not intent to besiege Amida but to bypass it. The decision to lay  
the siege was made after the death of the son of the king of the Chionites under the walls of the city 
(Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX, 1. 1- 2.12). 
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Military operations of Iranian armies in 359-360, (drawing by K. Maksymiuk). 
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Summary 
 
Strategic aims of Šāpur II during the campaign in northern Mesopotamia (359-360) 
 
In 359, Šāpur II (r. 309-379) led his army against Rome. This campaign became  
a milestone for the balance of power in Romano-Iranian borderlands. After seventy three Šāpur 
succeeded in breaking through the defenses and in sacking the city of Amida . According to 
Ammianus Marcellinus long lasting, heroic defense of Amida saved the Roman cities  
of Cappadocia from sacking. The author of the article believes that Amida was initial and 
primary target of Šāpur’s campaign of 359 and the siege was not a result of coincidence  
of various events, factors and intentions not, as it is suggested by Ammianus Marcellinus. 
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